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Abstract
Programmable packet-processing devices such as pro-
grammable switches and network interface cards are becom-
ing mainstream. These devices are programmed in a domain-
specific language such as P4, using a compiler to translate
packet-processing programs into instructions for different
targets. As networks with programmable devices become
widespread, it is critical that these compilers are dependable.
This paper considers the problem of finding bugs in com-
pilers for packet processing in the context of P416. We in-
troduce domain-specific techniques to induce both abnormal
termination of the compiler (crash bugs) and miscompilation
(semantic bugs). We apply these techniques to (1) the open-
source P4 compiler (P4C) infrastructure, which serves as a
common base for different P4 back ends; (2) the P4 back end
for the P4 reference software switch; and (3) the P4 back end
for the Barefoot Tofino switch.
Across the 3 platforms, over 4 months of bug finding, our
tool Gauntlet detected 78 new and distinct bugs (47 crash
and 31 semantic), which we confirmed with the respective
compiler developers. 44 have been fixed (27 crash and 17 se-
mantic); the remaining have been assigned to a developer. Our
bug-finding efforts also led to 6 P4 specification changes. We
have open sourced Gauntlet at https://github.com/p4gauntlet.
1 Introduction
Programmable packet-processing devices in the form of pro-
grammable switches and network interface cards (NICs) are
now common. Such devices provide network flexibility, allow-
ing operators to customize their network, researchers to exper-
iment with new network algorithms, and equipment vendors
to upgrade features rapidly in firmware rather than waiting
for new hardware. At the core of this move to programmable
packet processing are the domain-specific languages (DSLs)
for packet processing, along with the compilers that com-
pile DSL programs. As network programmability becomes
widespread, these DSL compilers will need to be as depend-
able as general-purpose compilers such as GCC and LLVM.
Motivated by these concerns, this paper considers the problem
of finding bugs in compilers for packet processing. Because
of the large open-source community around it, we ground our
paper in the context of P4 [7], but our ideas also extend to
similar DSLs such as NPL [8].
Bug finding in compilers is a well-studied topic, especially
in the context of C [13,26,27,46,48]. Past approaches (§2) to
bug finding in C compilers include fuzz testing by using ran-
domly generated C programs [26, 48], translation validation
(i.e., proving that a compiler correctly translated a given input
program to an output program) [33,36], and verification of in-
dividual compiler passes [30]. These prior approaches have to
contend with many difficulties inherent to a general-purpose
language like C, e.g., generating random programs that avoid
undefined and unspecified behavior [26,48], providing seman-
tics for pointers and memory aliasing [30], and inferring loop
invariants and simulation relations to successfully perform
translation validation [36].
Our key insight is that, by leveraging the domain-specific
nature of P4, we can avoid much of the complexity associ-
ated with bug finding for general-purpose languages. This re-
sults in simpler—and hence easier to implement—bug-finding
techniques. We leverage this insight to build a compiler bug-
finding tool for P4 called Gauntlet. Gauntlet uses three key
ideas that each build on the prior one: random program gen-
eration, translation validation, and symbolic execution. We
now describe these ideas and show how the restrictions of P4
allows them to be simpler than prior work.
First, we use random program generation (§4) to produce
syntactically correct and well-typed P4 programs that still
induce P4 compiler crashes. Because P4 has very little un-
defined behavior [15, §7.1.6], random program generation is
considerably simpler for P4 than for C [48]. This is because
the generator does not have to painstakingly avoid generating
programs with undefined and unspecified behavior, which
can be interpreted differently across different compilers. The
smaller and simpler grammar of P4 relative to C also simpli-
fies the development of a random program generator.
Second, we use translation validation (§5) [33, 36] to find
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miscompilations in P4 compilers in which we can access the
transformed program after every compiler pass. Traditionally,
translation validation for languages like C has suffered from
false alarms [33,46], where the validator is unable to prove the
correctness of translations and reports a compiler bug instead.
Fundamentally, false alarms are inevitable for unrestricted C:
proving program equivalence in the presence of unbounded
loops is undecidable. In P4 however, translation validation
is both theoretically decidable because the language is finite
by design1 and practically easier because of the absence of
pointers, aliasing, loops, and gotos.
Third, we use symbolic execution (§6) to generate input-
output test packets for P4 programs based on the semantics
we had to develop for translation validation. We use these test
packet pairs to find miscompilations in black-box and propri-
etary P4 compilers where we can not access the transformed
program after every compiler pass. Symbolic execution for
general-purpose languages [11] is effective at generating in-
puts that provide sufficient path coverage. But without lan-
guage semantics, determining the correct output for these test
inputs is hard. By creating formal semantics for P4 for transla-
tion validation, we are able to generate both input and output
test packets that can test the compiled output for a program.
We applied Gauntlet to 3 platforms (§7): (1) the open-
source P4 compiler infrastructure (P4C) [10], which serves
as a common base for different P4 compiler implementations;
(2) the P4 back end for the open-source P4 behavioral model
(BMv2) [6], a reference software switch for P4; and (3) the
P4 back end for Barefoot Tofino, a high-speed programmable
switching chip [4]. Across these 3 platforms, and over 4
months of testing, we found a total of 78 new and distinct
bugs, all of which were confirmed and assigned to a com-
piler developer. Our efforts also led to 6 changes to the P4
specification. 44 of these bugs have already been fixed. We
analyze these bugs in detail and describe where they were
found, their root causes, and which commits introduced them.
We conclude by describing our limitations (§8): the bugs we
can not find, the compiler passes we can not handle, and the
language constructs we do not cover. We have open sourced
our tools at https://github.com/p4gauntlet.
2 Background and Motivation
2.1 Approaches to Testing Compilers
Levels of compiler testing. A compiler must reject incorrect
programs with an appropriate error message and accurately
translate correct programs. However, a program can be cor-
rect to varying levels. McKeeman [31] provides a taxonomy
of these levels in the context of C (Table 1). Each level corre-
sponds to the program passing deeper into the compiler be-
1Finite in that input and output packets and state are finite bit vectors.
Loops are bounded (parsing [15, §12]) or forbidden (control flow [15, §13]).
Level Input Class Example of incorrect input
1 Sequence of ASCII characters Binary files
2 Sequence of words and spaces Variable name beginning with $
3 Syntactically correct Missing semicolon
4 Type correct Adding int to string
5 Statically conforming Undefined variables
6 Dynamically conforming Program throwing exceptions
7 Model-conforming Program producing wrong outputs
Table 1: McKeeman [31]’s 7 levels of C compiler correctness.
fore it is rejected (e.g., lexer, parser, type checker, optimizer,
code generator). The difficulty of generating test programs
also goes up with increasing input level. For instance, while
general-purpose fuzzers such as AFL [49] are sufficient to
stress test the lexer, more sophistication is required to gen-
erate syntactically correct and well-typed programs, which
are required to test the optimizer. In the context of the P4
compiler, we observed very limited success in bug finding
using a general-purpose fuzzer such as AFL, indicating that
testing at the first few levels of Table 1 is already handled
adequately by P4’s open-source compiler test suite [10, §3.4].
Hence, for this paper, we only consider programs at the
higher levels: static, dynamic, and model-conforming. These
are programs that pass the lexing, parsing, type checking,
and semantic analysis phases of the compiler, but still trigger
compiler bugs. Like Csmith [48], we categorize bugs into
crash bugs and semantic bugs. A crash bug occurs when the
compiler abnormally terminates on an input program without
producing either an output program or a useful error message.
Crash bugs include segmentation faults, assertion violations,
incomplete error messages, and out-of-memory errors. A
semantic bug occurs when the compiler produces an output
executable, but its behavior is different from the input pro-
gram, e.g., due to an incorrect program transformation in
a compiler optimization pass. In P4, semantic bugs simply
manifest as any packet output that differs from the expected
result. Crash bugs correspond to level 5 in Table 1; semantic
bugs correspond to levels 6 and 7.
Bug-finding strategies. We now look at how these bugs are
found. A key challenge in compiler bug finding is the oracle
problem. Given an input program to a compiler, the expected
outcome (i.e., should it accept/reject the program and what
should the output be?) is unclear unless one consults an all-
knowing oracle. Below, we outline the major techniques used
to approximate this oracle knowledge.
In differential testing [31], given two compilers, which both
receive the same input program, if compiler A’s output (after
compiling and running the program) differs from compiler
B’s output, there is a bug in one of them. This works as long
as there are at least two independent compiler implementa-
tions for the same language. Csmith [48] is one example of
this approach; it feeds the same randomly generated C pro-
gram to multiple C compilers and checks whether the outputs
generated by executing the binary produced by each compiler
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differ. Another example is Different Optimization Levels
(DOL) [13], which selectively omits compiler optimizations
and compares compiler outputs with and without these opti-
mization passes. If the end result differs after specific passes
have been skipped or added, it points to a bug. This technique
can be used in any compiler framework that supports selective
omission of optimizations.
Metamorphic testing [14] can serve a similar role as dif-
ferential testing, especially when multiple compilers are not
readily available or optimization passes can not be easily dis-
abled. Instead of feeding the same input program to different
compilers, different input programs that are expected to pro-
duce the same compiler output are fed to the same compiler.
The compiler outputs from these different input programs are
compared to determine if there is a bug or not. EMI is an
example of this approach [26]. Given a randomly generated C
program P, and random input I to this program, EMI uses the
path coverage tool gcov to identify dead code in P when run
on input I. EMI then prunes away this dead code to produce
new programs P′ whose output must agree with P’s output
when run on the input I. Then EMI compiles and runs both P
and P′ to check whether they indeed produce the same output
when given I as input.
Translation validation is a bug-finding technique that con-
verts the program before and after a compiler optimization
pass into a logical formula and checks if both programs/formu-
las are equivalent using a constraint solver [30, 33, 36, 50]. A
failed check indicates a semantic bug. Program equivalence
is an undecidable problem for Turing-complete languages
such as C, requiring manual assistance to perform translation
validation. Typical examples of manual assistance are (1)
simulation relations, which encode correspondences between
variables in two programs; and (2) loop invariants, required to
prove the equivalence of programs with loops. Both can often
be learned from running programs on test suites [33, 41], but
they are not guaranteed to be precise.
2.2 Motivating Gauntlet’s Design
We now turn to finding bugs in P4 compilers. Our approach
borrows from prior compiler bug-finding techniques, but
adapts them to programmable packet processing. From EMI
and Csmith, we borrow the idea of generating random pro-
grams that are lexically, syntactically, and semantically cor-
rect. Unlike EMI and Csmith, however, our random program
generation is simpler because it does not have to avoid unde-
fined behavior, which, by design, is limited in P416.
However, we can not directly apply either differential or
metamorphic testing to P4 compilers. Differential testing
requires two or more independent compiler implementations
that are comparable in their output. P416 compilers for differ-
ent hardware and software targets are not comparable because
program behavior is target-dependent [10, §2.1]. On the other
hand, presently there aren’t multiple independent compilers
for the same target. Further, code coverage tools like gcov
required for metamorphic testing such as EMI are not a part
of the P4 ecosystem. At the same time, many crash bugs
in P4 do not require the full power of differential or meta-
morphic testing to tease out. This is because they lead to
assertion violations. In other words, there is already an ora-
cle for many crash bugs without requiring a second compiler
implementation.
For semantic bugs, on the other hand, the domain-specific
nature of P4 makes translation validation easier relative to
general-purpose languages such as C. P4 programs are finite-
state and finite-time, making program equivalence decidable
at a theoretical level. P4’s lack of pointers, memory aliasing,
and unstructured control flow (e.g., goto), makes it practically
easier to develop translation validation for the language. Addi-
tionally, an approach based on translation validation provides
more completeness than randomized testing approaches such
as EMI and Csmith because it exhaustively searches over all
packet inputs to the a P4 program to find semantic bugs.
Hence, we combine random testing with formal methods to
find P4 compiler bugs. First, we generate random programs to
find crash bugs. Second, we convert these random programs
into Z3 [16] logic formulas and assert that the logic formulas
before and after a compiler pass are equivalent. Third, we use
the same logic formulas to determine test cases (i.e., input-
output packet pairs) for these random programs. These test
cases are then used to test the target implementation of the P4
programs for proprietary compilers.
2.3 Goals and Non-Goals
Find many, but not all bugs. Our goal is to find many crash
and semantic bugs in the P4 compiler, but our tool is not
exhaustive. Specifically, we are not seeking to build a fully
verified compiler like CompCert [28], given the large labor
and time costs associated with such an undertaking and the
diversity of P4 targets. For instance, after many years of
development, CompCert still only supports a restricted subset
of C. Instead, our goal is to strengthen existing P4 compilers,
not to write a safe replacement.
Check the compiler, not the programmer. We are not trying
to verify that a particular P4 program is written correctly rela-
tive to a specification or that it is devoid of certain kinds of
bugs. This problem is addressed by orthogonal work on P4
program verification [19, 21, 29, 37, 44] and P4 testing [42].
Although Gauntlet can in principle be used in for verifying
the program, we have not optimized it to scale to such pro-
gram verification use cases. Currently, we can not verify large
data plane switch programs such as switch.p4 [43] in a rea-
sonable amount of time. The random programs we generate
to find bugs in the P4 compiler are much smaller and more
targeted than switch.p4, and our tool does not need to be
able to generate and efficiently solve Z3 formulas for large
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Figure 1: An example P4 compilation model.
P4 programs to tease out compiler bugs.
Develop target-independent techniques. We are designing
our tools to be as target-independent as possible and specialize
them to test the front and mid end of the compiler. While
we support restricted forms of back-end testing (§6.1), we do
so in a way that allows us to quickly integrate and adapt to
new back ends without having to understand detailed target-
specific behavior. In particular, we do not cover target-specific
semantics such as externs [15, §4.3].
Only test mature compilers. We only test mature compilers
such as P4C and the corresponding behavioral model2 as
well as the commercial Tofino compiler. For example, P4C
supports other back ends such as the eBPF, uBPF, and PSA
targets, which are pre-alpha quality and preliminary compiler
toolchains. Finding bugs is likely unhelpful for the respective
compiler developers at this moment.
3 Background on P4
P4 is a statically typed, domain-specific language designed to
describe computations on network packet headers. This paper
focuses on P416, the latest version of P4 [15]. Figure 1 shows
the main P416 concepts, which we explain below.
Packages and targets. A P4 program consists of a set of
procedures; each procedure is loaded into a programmable
block of the target (e.g., a switch [4] or NIC [35]). These
programmable blocks correspond to various subsystems such
as the parser or the match-action pipeline. The package lists
the available programmable blocks in a target. One example
of a package for a target is the v1model, which models the
architecture of a BMv2 [6] software switch target, referred
2Both have entered “permanent beta-status” since November 2019: https:
//github.com/p4lang/p4c/issues/2080
to as “simple switch” [20]. For simplicity, we will refer to
BMv2 as the target instead of simple switch.
P4 compilers. A P416 compiler translates a P416 program
and the target package model into target-dependent instruc-
tions. These target instructions are combined with the non-
programmable blocks (e.g., a fixed scheduler) to form the
target’s data plane. These instructions also specify how this
data plane can be accessed and configured by the control
plane (see also Figure 1). P4C [10] is the official open-source
reference compiler infrastructure of the P416 language and im-
plements the current state of the specification. P4C employs
a nanopass design [40], which takes shape as a composable li-
brary of front- and mid-end compiler passes that perform code
analysis, transformation, and optimization on input programs.
We analyze these nanopasses using translation validation.
Compiler back ends. To implement a P416 compiler, develop-
ers write P4C back ends, which use P4C’s front- and mid-end
passes along with their own back-end specific transforma-
tions, to translate P416 code into instructions for their own
target. In this paper, we focus on 2 production-grade P4C
back ends: the Tofino [4] and BMv2 [6] back ends.
Parsers and control blocks. A parser is a finite state machine
that transforms an incoming byte sequence received at the tar-
get into a structured representation of header definitions. For
example, incoming bytes may be parsed as packets contain-
ing Ethernet, IP, and TCP/UDP headers. A deparser converts
this representation back into a byte sequence. Control blocks
describe the per-packet operations that are performed on the
input header. These operations are described in the form of
the core primitives of the language: tables, actions, metadata,
and extern objects.
Tables. Tables are objects in the control block similar to a
Java map or Python dictionary. Table entries are match-action
pairs inserted by the network’s control plane [12, 32]. When
a table is applied to a packet traversing the control block, its
header is compared against the match key of all match-action
entries in the table. If any entry’s key matches the header,
the action associated with the match is executed. Actions are
procedures that can modify state and/or input headers.
Calling conventions. P416 uses “copy-in/copy-out” [15, §6.7]
semantics for method calls. For any callable object in P4, the
parameter direction (also known as mode [22, §8.2]) explicitly
specifies which parameters are read-only and which parame-
ters can be modified, with the modifications persisting after
the function terminates. Modifiable parameters are labelled
with the direction inout or out in the definition of the pro-
cedure. Read-only values are marked in. At the start of a
procedure call, the arguments are copied left-to-right into the
associated parameter slots. Parameters with out label remain
uninitialized. Once the procedure has terminated, all proce-
dure parameters with the label inout or out are copied back
towards the original input arguments.
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Metadata. Metadata is programmer-defined or target-specific
data that is associated with a packet header, while it traverses
the target. Examples of metadata include the packet input port,
packet length, queue depth, or priority; this information is
interpreted by the target according to target-specific rule sets
independent of the P4 language specification. Metadata can
also be modified during the execution of the control block.
Externs. Externs are an extensibility mechanism, which al-
lows targets to describe built-in functionality; externs are
object-like and have methods. Examples include calls to
checksum units, hash units, counters, and meters. P4’s calling
conventions allow reasoning about externs to some degree;
they act like uninterpreted functions with limited side effects.
Categories of P4 compiler bugs. While we focused our bug-
finding techniques on the crash and semantic bugs that we
described earlier, we also tracked other types of bugs, which
we did not include in our total bug count. For instance, some
of our bugs resulted in changes to the P4 specification [15],
which we term specification bugs. Similarly, the compiler did
not output syntactically correct programs after all compiler
optimization passes, which we labeled as invalid transforma-
tions. These bugs aren’t semantic or crash bugs, but were still
considered bugs and fixed by the compiler maintainers.
4 Random Program Generation
4.1 Design
We require diverse input programs to exercise many compiler
passes—and hence crash or semantic bugs in those passes.
P4C already contains a sample of over 600 programs as part
of its test suite, but it is unlikely that these programs trigger
bugs. As part of testing, the compiler developers typically
inspect the reference output of each of the compiled test pro-
grams after the front- and mid-end passes to check for regres-
sions [10, §3.4]. While P4Fuzz [1] is a tool that can generate
random P4 programs, we found that the programs generated
by P4Fuzz are not complex enough to trigger new crash or
semantic bugs. For instance, programs generated by P4Fuzz
contain arbitrarily long and random variable names, but such
programs are useful only for triggering bugs from the first
few levels of Table 1. We require randomness at the level of
the abstract syntax tree, not within a single token.
Instead, we developed our own generator for random P4
programs. With this generator we can exercise the majority
of language constructs in the P4. This leads to diverse test
programs covering a range of unique combinations of P4
expressions. We can use these test programs to find programs
that lead to an unexpected crash in any pass of the compiler
for the specific target. The amount of randomly generated
code in our tool is user-configurable, allowing us to keep the
size of the program under test small and targeted. This allows
us to find an ample number of semantic bugs while avoiding
the path explosion problems of symbolic execution on these
random programs.
The design of our random program generator is influenced
by Csmith [48] and follows its philosophy of generating only
well-formed input programs that pass the lexer, parser, and
type checker. At a high level, our generator grows an abstract
syntax tree (AST) corresponding to the random program by
probabilistically determining what kind of AST node to add
to the AST at each step. By adjusting the probabilities of
generating each AST node, we can steer the generator to-
wards the language constructs we want to focus on. However,
whereas Csmith avoids generating C programs with undefined
behaviour, we accommodate it. This is because we chose to
provide our own semantics for undefined behavior in P4 as
part of the logic formulas that we generate for P4 during
translation validation. This allows us to inform compiler de-
velopers of suspicious—but not necessarily wrong—compiler
transformations on P4 programs with undefined behavior, if
it diverges from our semantics.
4.2 Implementation
We implement our random P4 program generator as extension
to P4C. The generator uses the intermediate representation
(IR) of P4C to automatically grow an abstract syntax tree
(AST) by expanding branches of the tree at random. For
example, a block statement may generate up to (say) 10 state-
ments or declarations, which in turn may result in further
sub nodes. This AST is then converted into a P4 program
using P4C’s ToP4 module. Our random program generator
can be specialized towards different compiler back ends by
providing a skeleton of the back-end-specific P4 package,
back-end-specific restrictions, and which package blocks are
to be filled with program snippets. We have currently im-
plemented two back ends for our random program generator
corresponding to the BMv2 [20] and Tofino [4] targets.
Programs generated by our random program generator are
required to be syntactically sound and well-typed. Our aim
is not to test if the compiler’s parser can correctly catch syn-
tax errors; P4C already tests those. If P4C’s parser and type
checker (correctly) rejected a generated program, we consider
this to be a bug in our random program generator. For exam-
ple, if an action parameter has a inout or out qualifier, only
writable variables may be passed as arguments.
5 Translation Validation
5.1 Design
To detect semantic bugs, we employ translation valida-
tion [36], a classic technique from the compiler literature
in which an external tool certifies that a particular compiler
pass has correctly transformed a given input program. To per-
form translation validation for P4, we developed a symbolic
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Figure 2: Translation validation in Gauntlet.
interpreter for the P416 language to transform P4 programs
into Z3 formulas [16].
Figure 2 describes P4 translation validation. To validate a
P4 program, the symbolic interpreter converts the program
into a Z3 formula capturing its input-output semantics. An
equivalence checker then submits the Z3 formulas of a pro-
gram before and after a compiler pass to the Z3 SMT solver.
The solver tries to find an input that violates equivalence of
these two formulas. If it finds such an input, we report it
as a semantic bug to the compiler maintainers. Translation
validation has two advantages over random testing. First, it
can accurately detect subtle differences in program semantics
without any knowledge about expected input packets or table
entries. Second, if we can access intermediate P4 programs
after each compiler pass, we can pinpoint the erroneous pass.
5.2 Implementation
Like our random program generator, we wrote the interpreter
as an extension to P4C. We use the IR generated by the
P4C parser to determine the semantics of the P4 program.
Each programmable block of a P4 package represents an
independent Z3 formula. For example, the v1model pack-
age [20] of the BMv2 back end has 6 different indepen-
dent programmable blocks: Parser, VerifyChecksum, Ingress,
Egress, ComputeChecksum, and Deparser. For each block,
we generate a new Z3 formula. We now describe the symbolic
interpreter and equivalence checker in more detail.
Developing the symbolic interpreter. Overall, it took us 5
months of implementation effort until our symbolic inter-
preter was reliable enough to find new semantic bugs in P4
compilers—as opposed to encountering false alarms that were
actually interpreter bugs. The fact that P4C contains a sizeable
test suite [10, §3.4] was helpful in stress testing our interpreter.
We started our development process by performing transla-
tion validation on programs in the P4C test suite. A semantic
bug on one of these test programs is probably a false alarm
and a bug in our interpreter. This is because it is unlikely
that the compiler miscompiles test suite programs since the
reference outputs of each test after the front- and mid-end
passes are tracked as part of regression testing. We continu-
ously consulted with the compiler developers to ensure our
understanding of the language semantics was correct.
However, we quickly realized that we also needed to gener-
ate random programs to achieve coverage and truly stress test
Gauntlet. Subsequently, we co-evolved the interpreter with
our generator. We attribute part of our success in finding bugs
to this development technique, since it forced us to consider
many edge cases—more than P4C does. The test suite for our
interpreter now has over 600 P4C tests plus an additional 100
tests that we developed.
Eventually, our interpreter had become complete and reli-
able enough to perform translation validation for randomly
generated programs. This then allowed us to identify seman-
tic bugs in P4C. After we had detected the first semantic bug,
we randomly generated around 10000 programs every week
and added the resulting compiler bugs to our backlog. Adding
support for new P4 language features as part of random pro-
gram generation typically led to a crash in our interpreter.
After we fixed our own bug, we were frequently able to find
new semantic bugs in the P4 compiler that pertained to those
language features. Because any of the compiler passes may
have bugs, our symbolic interpreter does not rely on any com-
piler pass other than the P4C parser and the ToP4 module
to produce P4 code from the IR. Hence, we designed our
interpreter to handle any P4 program that successfully passed
the P4C parser, i.e., before it is desugared.
Converting P4 programs into Z3 formulas. We now describe
briefly how we convert a P4 program into a Z3 logic formula.
Figure 3 shows an example. Conceptually, our goal is to
represent P4 programs in a functional form so that the input-
output behavior of the functional form is identical to the input-
output behavior of the P4 program. To determine function
inputs and outputs, we use the parameter directions of each
P4 package. Parameters with the direction inout and out
make up the output Z3 data type of the function. Parameters
with the in and inout direction make up the input Z3 data
type of the function.
To determine the functional form, the symbolic interpreter
traverses each path through the P4 program, maintaining ex-
pressions representing path conditions for branching. Once
it reaches a portion of the program where execution ends, it
stores an if-then-else Z3 expression with the condition set to
the path condition and the return value set to a tuple consisting
of the inout and out parameters at that point. Ultimately, the
interpreter will return a single nested if-then-else Z3 expres-
sion, with each branch corresponding to a unique output from
the program under a set of conditions.
Using this expression we can perform operations such as
equivalence checking between two Z3 formulas for trans-
lation validation or querying Z3 to provide an output for
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1 struct Hdr { bit <8> a; bit <8> b; }
2
3 control ingress(inout Hdr hdr) {
4 action assign () { hdr.a = 1; }
5 table t {
6 key = hdr.a : exact;
7 actions = {
8 assign ();
9 NoAction ();
10 }
11 default_action = NoAction ();
12 }
13 apply {
14 t.apply ();
15 }
16 }
(a) Simplified P4 program applying a table.
1 Input: t_table_key , t_action , hdr
2 Output: hdr_out
3
4 hdr_out =
5 if (hdr.a == t_table_key) :
6 if (1 == t_action) : Hdr(1, hdr.b);
7 otherwise : Hdr(hdr.a, hdr.b);
8 otherwise : Hdr(hdr.a, hdr.b);
(b) Its semantic interpretation in Z3 shown in functional form.
Figure 3: A P4 table converted to Z3 semantics.
particular input for test case generation. While the generated
Z3 formulas could in principle be very large because of the
path explosion problem, we haven’t yet had to optimize our
formulas, given the small size of our generated programs.
Handling tables. The contents of a table are unknown at
compile time. Since we want to make sure we cover any pos-
sible table content, we interpret match-action pairs in tables
completely symbolically. Figure 3 describes a simplified ex-
ample of how Gauntlet interprets tables within a control block.
Per match-action table call, we generate one symbolic match
(t_table_key) and one symbolic action variable (t_action),
which represent a single match key and its choice of action
respectively. We compare the symbolic packet header with
the symbolic match key (hdr.a == t_table_key). If the ex-
pression evaluates to true it implies the execution of a specific
action, which is chosen based on the value of the symbolic
action index (t_action). We express this as a series of nested
if-then-else statements per action available to the table. Fi-
nally, if the key does not match, the default action is selected.
For instance, in Figure 3, we execute action assign (action
id 1) iff the symbolic match variable (t_table_key) equals
the symbolic header (hdr.a) and the symbolic action variable
(t_action) equals 1. With this encoding we can avoid having
to use a separate symbolic match-action pair for every entry in
the match-action table, which is a prohibitively large number
of symbolic variables.
Header validity. The P416 specification does not explicitly re-
strict the behavior of header validity. We model our semantics
to align with the implementation in P4C. We clarified these
assumptions with the compiler and specification maintainers.
If a previously invalid header is marked valid, all fields in
that header are initially set to arbitrary unknown values. If an
invalid header is returned in the final output, all fields in the
header are set to invalid as well.
Interpreting function calls. Any out parameter in a function
call is initially set undefined. If the function returns, we also
generate a new free Z3 variable. In our interpreter, externs are
treated as a normal function call. However each argument for
a parameter that has the label inout and out is set to a new
free Z3 variable because the behavior of extern is unknown—
similar to an uninterpreted function. Copy-in/copy-out seman-
tics, albeit necessary to control side effects in extern objects,
have been a persistent source of bugs in the compiler. A
significant portion of the semantic bugs we identified were
caused by erroneous passes that perform incorrect argument
evaluation and side effect ordering.
Checking equivalence between P4 programs. We use
p4test to emit a P4 program after each compiler pass.
p4test is a P4C back end used to test P4C. It does not
produce any output but exercises all the default front- and
mid-end passes. We only examine passes that actually modify
the input program and ignore any emitted intermediate pro-
gram that has a hash identical to its predecessor. We explicitly
reparse each emitted P4 file to also catch misbehavior in the
parser and the ToP4 module.
For two P4 programs transformed by a compiler pass, A
and B, we perform a pair-wise equivalence check. We use our
interpreter to retrieve the Z3 formulas for all programmable
blocks of the program package and compare each individual
block of A to the corresponding block in B. The query for
the Z3 solver is a simple inequality. It is satisfiable only if
there is a Z3 assignment (e.g., a packet header input or table
match-action entry) in which the Z3 formula of A produces a
different output from B.
If the inequality query is satisfiable, it produces the assign-
ment that would lead to different results and saves the failed
passes for later analysis. With this technique we can precisely
pinpoint in which pass a semantic bug may have happened
and we can also infer the packet values we need to trigger
the bug. If the report turns out to be a false alarm and is not
confirmed by compiler developers, we consider this a bug in
our translation validation semantics, which we fix.
6 Symbolic Execution
6.1 Design
Our approach to translation validation is applicable only in
scenarios where we have access to the IR (and hence the P4
program) because it rests on having semantics for P4. This
is the case for P4C, which has a flag that allows us to emit
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Figure 4: Symbolic execution in Gauntlet.
the P4 program after every compiler pass as a transformed P4
program [10, §3.3]. However, in the back end, a P4 compiler
employs back-end-specific passes that translate P4 into their
own proprietary formats. Some of these proprietary formats
are undocumented, making it hard to provide semantics for
them. This renders translation validation impractical.
To address the unavailability of P4 in these scenarios, we
developed a bug-finding approach based on automatic test-
case generation coupled with symbolic execution. We reuse
our symbolic interpreter from translation validation to gener-
ate a Z3 formula of a generated input program (Figure 4).
With this representation of a P4 program, we can solve for
a packet input that corresponds to a given output and craft
packets that traverse unique paths in the processing pipeline.
We follow a typical approach to symbolic execution [11].
Based on unique path conditions we generate a test case for
each path and feed this case into the testing framework of the
compiler’s target. If the framework reports a mismatch, we
know that there is likely to be a bug. This test technique can
identify semantic bugs without requiring access to the P4 pro-
gram after every intermediate compiler pass. However, unlike
the translation validation approach, it is harder to pinpoint the
source of the bug.
6.2 Implementation
Symbolic execution requires a functional P4 target and a
testing framework that is capable of taking input packets and
producing output packets, which can be matched against an
arbitrary expected output. We developed symbolic execution
for two back ends: (1) the BMv2 back end that uses the
simple test framework (STF) [9], which feeds packets to a
software test switch, records packet capture files, and verifies
that the observed packet values correspond to the expected
output and (2) the Tofino back end that uses the Packet Test
Framework (PTF) [5] to inject and receive packets. We use
the Tofino software simulator to check for semantic bugs
in Tofino. We initially reconfirmed every semantic bug we
found on the Tofino hardware target, but ultimately switched
to running only the simulator for testing velocity. However,
we confirmed all Tofino bugs with the compiler developers.
Undefined variables. Undefined variables are difficult to
model in end-to-end tests since any back end is free to per-
form arbitrary operations on these variables. We were left
with two choices: (1) we could avoid undefined behavior in
our P4 programs; (2) alternatively, we could ascribe specific
values to undefined variables and check if these values con-
form with the implementation of the particular target. We
picked the second approach because it allows independent
testing of compiler optimizations in the face of undefined
language constructs.
Computing input and output for test cases. We generate a Z3
formula for a given program using our symbolic interpreter.
As we do not have control over paths that involve undefined
variables because we cannot force a target to assign specific
values to such variables, we add conditions which will cause
Z3 to only give us solutions for specific restricted program
paths. For any path we can control (for example, a branch that
depends on the value of an input header) we compute all the
possible input-output values that lead to a new path through
the P4 program. This technique is computationally expensive,
because the number of paths can be exponential in the length
of the program. However, in practice, because the size of the
generated programs is small, test-case generation followed by
testing on a P4 program still completes quickly in practice.
For every path, we feed these conditions into the solver and
retrieve a candidate model of input-output values that would
cause program execution to go down that path. Because there
are typically many solutions for these input-output values, we
configure the Z3 solver to give us input and corresponding
output values that are non-zero. In some back ends, using
zero values by default may mask erroneous behavior. For
example, since BMv2 initializes any undefined variable with
zero, the bug in program 5c would not have been caught, had
we not asked Z3 for a non-zero input-output pair.
7 Results
We now analyze the P4 compiler bugs found by Gauntlet. Our
findings are summarized below.
1. We confirmed a total of 78 new, distinct bugs across the
P4C framework and the BMv2 and Tofino P4 compilers.
Of these bugs, 47 are crash and 31 are semantic bugs.
2. Our efforts also led to 6 P4 specification changes.
3. We achieved this in the span of only 4 months of test-
ing with Gauntlet, and despite only generating random
programs from a limited subset of the P416 language.
4. Symbolic execution is effective enough to find semantic
bugs in closed-source back ends such as the Tofino com-
piler, despite us not having access to the intermediate
representation of the P4 program.
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Bug Type Status P4C BMv2 Tofino
Crash
Filed 26 2 25
Confirmed 25 2 20
Fixed 21 2 4
Semantic
Filed 26 2 10
Confirmed 21 2 8
Fixed 15 2 0
Total 78 46 4 28
Table 2: Bug summary. Unfixed bugs have been assigned.
Location P4C BMv2 Tofino Total
Front End 33 - - 33
Mid End 13 - - 13
Back End - 4 28 32
Total 46 4 28 78
Table 3: Distribution of bugs in the P4 compilers.
7.1 Sources of Bugs
We distinguish the bugs we found into three primary sources:
bugs we found in the common P4C framework and bugs we
found in the actual compiler back ends, BMv2 and the Tofino
compiler. Both BMv2 and Tofino use the P4C front- and
mid-end passes. Hence, most bugs detected in P4C also likely
apply to these back ends. Note that since the Tofino back end
is closed source, we don’t know which P4C passes it uses.
Distribution of Bugs. Table 3 lists where we identified bugs.
The overall majority of bugs were found in the P4C front-
and mid-end framework, mainly because we concentrated
on these areas. The majority of the back end bugs were
found in the Tofino compiler. There are two reasons for this:
first, the Tofino back end is more complex than BMv2 as it
compiles for a high-speed hardware target and second, we did
not extensively test BMv2 as it is mostly a reference switch
for the compiler developers.
Bugs in the P4C infrastructure. As Table 2 shows, we were
able to confirm 78 distinct bugs over 4 months. 46 were
uncovered in P4C, with an even distribution of crash bugs (25)
and semantic bugs (21). Initially, the majority of bugs that
we found were crash bugs. However, after these crash bugs
were fixed, and as our symbolic interpreter became reliable,
the semantic bugs began to exceed the crash bugs.
In addition, 6 of the bugs we found led to corresponding
changes in the specification as they uncovered missing cases
or ambiguous behavior because our interpretation of a spe-
cific language construct clashed with the interpretation of the
compiler developers and language designers. We also continu-
ously checked out the master branch to test the latest compiler
improvements for bugs. A significant number of bugs (16 out
of 46) were caused after recent merges of pull requests during
the months in which we used Gauntlet for testing. Gauntlet
was able to quickly catch these bugs as well. Thus, we believe
it would be useful for the P4 compiler developers to use it as
a continuous integration tool.
Bugs in the Tofino compiler. Symbolic execution on the pro-
prietary compiler was also successful. We were able to con-
firm 20 crash bugs and 8 semantic bugs in the Tofino compiler.
We note that all of these bugs were completely distinct from
the bugs reported to P4C. In fact, the majority of bugs present
in P4C could be reproduced in the Tofino compiler as well,
because it uses P4C for its front and mid end. Hence, in our
Tofino bug count we do not include any front- and mid-end
crash and semantic bugs present in the Tofino compiler that
were already triggered as part of testing P4C. We also do not
include Tofino compiler crashes that were caused by a missed
transformation in the P4C front end. The Tofino back end
was relying on these passes to correctly transform specific
P4 expressions. We filed two of these crashes in the Tofino
compiler as missed optimization issues in P4C.
Derivative bugs. 5 of the 78 bugs we found were crash bugs
that were not directly caused by random programs generated
by Gauntlet. Instead, they were caused by handcrafting spe-
cific P416 programs containing specific language constructs.
These handcrafted P416 programs were inspired by discus-
sions related to either specification changes or compiler bugs
originally found by Gauntlet. We included these bugs in our
count because even though they were handcrafted, they were
seeded by bug reports originating from Gauntlet. We also
encountered 2 new crash bugs when manually reducing our
randomly generated programs for semantic bugs. For instance,
we uncovered a crash bug caused by a P4 parser loop because
we removed transition expressions [15, §12.5] as part of re-
ducing one of our randomly generated programs. However,
all our semantic bugs were found directly by Gauntlet.
Fixing the bugs. Out of the 78 new bugs we filed, 44 have
been fixed. The remaining bugs have been assigned a devel-
oper, but are open because we filed them very recently, they
required a specification change to be resolved first, or they
have been deprioritized in favor of more pressing bug reports.
We have received confirmation by the Tofino compiler devel-
opers that 4 bugs have already been resolved, the remainder
are targeted to be resolved by the next release.
7.2 Deep Dive into Bugs
Snowball effects. We observed that many crash bugs were
caused because a preceding pass incorrectly transformed an
expression or did not process it at all. For example, in pro-
gram 5a the SimplifyDefUse [9] pass removed all variables
in the caller scope because of the return statement in the func-
tion, although inout parameters continue to exist in the scope.
The consequence of this optimization was a crash in a subse-
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1 bit <8> test(inout bit <8> x) {
2 return x;
3 }
4 control ig(inout Hdr h) {
5 apply {
6 test(h.h.a);
7 }
8 }
(a) A bug caused by a defective pass.
1 control ig(inout Hdr h, ...) {
2 apply {
3 h.h.a = (1 << h.h.c) + 8w2;
4 }
5 }
(b) A crash in the type checker.
1 control ig(inout Hdr h, ...) {
2 apply {
3 bool tmp = 1 != 8w2[7:0];
4 }
5 }
(c) An incorrect type checking error.
1 control ig(inout Hdr h, ...) {
2 action a(inout bit <7> val) {
3 h.h.a[0:0] = 0;
4 }
5 apply {
6 a(h.h.a[7:1]);
7 }
8 }
(d) Incorrect deletion of an assignment.
1 control ig(inout Hdr h, ...) {
2 apply {
3 h.h.setInvalid ();
4 h.h.a = 1;
5 h.eth.src_addr = h.h.a;
6 if (h.eth.src_addr != 1) {
7 h.h.setValid ();
8 h.h.a = 1;
9 }
10 }
11 }
(e) An unsafe compiler optimization.
1 control ig(inout Hdr h, ...) {
2 action a(inout bit <16> val) {
3 val = 3;
4 exit;
5 }
6 apply {
7 a(h.eth.eth_type);
8 }
9 }
(f) Incorrect interpretation of exit statements.
Figure 5: Examples of bugs that were caught by Gauntlet.
quent type checking pass because all variable definitions were
cleared and the type checking pass was unable to find the
variables corresponding to the inout parameter. In another
case, the InlineFunctions [9] pass did not fully inline all
functions calls, causing a crash in back ends that were not
able to understand function calls and expected them to have
been inlined by then.
Crashes in the type checker. Many of the crashes (18 out
of 25) were in the type checker infrastructure. The code
in 5b shows an expression that crashed type checking. It is
not possible to shift this value since its width is unknown at
compile-time. This code is illegal, but the specification did
not explicitly forbid it. The type checker tried to infer a type
regardless and crashed. This bug also triggered two updates
to the P416 specification. In other cases, the type checker was
incorrectly forbidding a valid expression. In example 5c, the
program was legal, but because the StrengthReduction [9]
pass was missing a safety check, the resulting slice index was
computed to be negative, which prompted the type checker to
terminate with an error message.
Handling side effects. Side effects from a function operate on
the concept of copy-in/copy-out semantics, described earlier.
However, these semantics, while seemingly simple, turn out
to be hard to implement correctly in the compiler. A large
subset of the semantic bugs we found (at least 8 out of 21)
can be traced back to incorrect handling of side effects and
copy-in/copy-out. A particularly tricky case can be seen in
5d. In the program, a slice of a variable is passed as an inout
parameter. At the same time, a disjoint subset of the variable
is assigned within the function. The correct behavior here is
to leave the assignment, and copy back the sliced portion of
the variable. However, the compiler assumed that the entire
variable would be assigned and removed the assignment in
line 3, an incorrect optimization.
Unstable code. We also found incidents of unstable code [47],
which, while conforming with the specification, may lead to
stability issues in specific back end targets. Dumitru et al.
also discuss the potential safety consequences of undefined
variable access in P416 [18].
Program 5e is a concrete example. The compiler collapses
the assignment of line 4 into line 5, setting h.eth.src_addr,
which is still part of a valid header, to 1. All of this is legal
behavior, since read and write operations on invalid header
values are undefined as part of the P4 specification. The
compiler is free to perform these optimizations. However,
these changes may cause issues in specific back ends, e.g.,
back ends in which assignments to invalid headers are no-
ops. In this case, the compiler has chosen a particular subset
interpretation of undefined behavior, which may clash with the
expectations of programmers for that back end. We raised this
with the compiler developers, who agreed to print a warning.
Consequences of compiler changes. Once we started actively
monitoring the master branch of P4C we observed that many
(16 out 46) of the bugs we filed in P4C were caused by recent
merges into master. A notable example is a recent improve-
ment to the Predication [9] pass, which caused at least 4 (1
crash and 3 semantic) new bugs. We caught and filed these
bugs quickly during our weekly routine random code gener-
ation. A few P4 programmers also filed bugs on this issue.
Their reports were considered duplicates because of our ear-
lier reports, highlighting that our bugs affect P4 programmers.
Specification changes. Some of our bug reports kicked off
larger discussions and changes around the P4 language spec-
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ification. Our bug reports and questions have led to at least
6 distinct specification changes. For example, a concern we
had about the validity of uninitialized headers led to three
clarification pull requests on the specification repository and
a suggestion to propose more fundamental changes for a 2.0
version of the language.
Another prominent example was caused by am-
biguity in the specification. In example 5f, the
RemoveActionParameters [9] compiler pass moved
the statement in line 3 after the exit statement, because the
assumption was that exits called within functions ignores
the copy-in/copy-out semantics. We instead interpreted exit
statements to still respect copy-in/copy-out semantics and
caught the discrepancy. We filed this as a concern with the
open-source community and our interpretation was deemed
reasonable, which required a specification update. The
corresponding compiler changes resulted in at least 3 new
bugs, which we detected and filed.
Invalid transformations. Lastly, we uncovered several small
issues with how P4 code is emitted and transformed across
compiler passes. We detected these bugs by reparsing each
P4 program after it had been emitted by the ToP4 compiler
module. If the emitted program can not be parsed, it indicates
a bug in either ToP4 or a compiler pass. While these bugs typi-
cally do not harm correctness, they affect compiler debugging.
P4C provides the option to emit transformed programs after
each pass as a valid P4 program. Consequently, the compiler
developers try to maintain an invariant that each compiler
pass in the front and mid end needs to produce syntactically
correct P4. Additionally, we found a case where the emitted
program being syntactically incorrect was a symptom of a
larger bug that affected the compiler’s functionality. Overall,
we identified 4 such bugs of invalid intermediate P4; these 4
bugs are not included in our count of 78. All were fixed.
7.3 Lessons Learned
P4C debugging support. P4C has several facilities that turned
out to be useful for our bug-finding process. The ability to
dump the intermediate representation, specify which passes to
dump, and the ToP4 tool, which converts the P4 IR to P4 pro-
grams, have greatly accelerated our development process. In
addition, the compiler has comprehensive assert instrumenta-
tion with distinct messages, which we used to identify unique
crash bugs and to distinguish them from error messages. The
AST visitor library in P4C allowed us to develop extensions
like our random program generator and interpreter.
P4C’s nanopass architecture, which factors the compiler
into a large number of “thin” passes, helps significantly with
bug fixing, especially in the context of semantic bugs that
were narrowed down to one pass by translation validation.
A different architecture that has fewer “thick” passes would
need more developer effort to fix semantic bugs. We also
observed that almost all crash bugs were assertion violations
where an invariant was violated in a particular compiler pass
due to an incorrect or absent compiler transformation from a
previous pass. In the absence of such assertions, these crash
bugs could have easily manifested as semantic bugs that are
harder to detect.
Reporting bugs. This project would not have been possible
without the responsiveness and receptiveness of the P4 com-
munity. Our questions, concerns, and bug reports were an-
swered within a day and in great detail. The developers were
able to even dissect our initial questions and confusions into
bug reports, guiding us further in our development effort.
We were encouraged to participate in the language design
working group that discusses changes to the P4 specification.
Likewise, when we filed bugs for the closed-source and
proprietary Tofino compiler, we found the developers to be
receptive and responsive. Still, the pace of bug finding and
fixing with the Tofino compiler was slower than the open-
source compiler because of two unavoidable reasons. First,
we naturally didn’t have access to the company bug tracker
to assess the life cycle of our bug once it had been filed.
Second, the official binary of the Tofino compiler updates
less frequently than P4C, which can be rebuilt from source
after every commit. Hence, we would trigger the same bugs
repeatedly in our testing until a new Tofino compiler version
with a bug fix was released. Neither of these two problems
would manifest, if our tool was to be used internally as part
of the compiler development process for Tofino.
Combining random testing with formal methods. One
broader takeaway from our results is that a combination of
random testing and formal methods is effective at finding bugs
in compilers. We use random testing to induce crash bugs
and we combine it with translation validation and symbolic
execution based on formal Z3 semantics to detect semantic
bugs using the same programs. This is a departure from
prior compiler bug finding that relies almost exclusively on
methods from either random testing [26, 48] or formal meth-
ods [23, 30, 33].
8 Limitations
Limitations of symbolic execution. A key assumption in the
symbolic execution approach is that generated test cases can
actually be fed to the back end of the compiler under test. We
have found that test cases where the input packets have certain
values in their headers can be dropped silently by the back
end without generating an output packet. Effectively, there
is a mismatch between the Z3 semantics, which says that a
certain output packet must be produced and the back end’s
semantics, which produces no output packet (this limitation
is also known as the “environment problem” [11]). In such
cases, we have had to discard these test cases, reducing the
breadth of coverage for testing the compiler.
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Missing simulation relations. Our translation validation tech-
nique in its current form is not resilient to declared, but unde-
fined, variables being renamed by a compiler pass. There are
two potential solutions. We can leverage annotations by the
compiler to maintain the original source name of a variable.
Or we can augment our equivalence checking with a simula-
tion relation—a mapping from variable names before the pass
to variable names after the pass. Early work on translation
validation for C automatically infers these simulation rela-
tions [33]. We plan to investigate such techniques under the
constraint of avoiding false alarms. We note, however, that for
the vast majority (53 out of 57) of compiler passes, in which
we tried to find semantic bugs, we did not need simulation
relations to tease out semantic bugs.
Unsupported language constructs. We currently do not gen-
erate programs that contain several P416 language features:
extern definitions or calls, method overloading, type defi-
nitions, variable bit vectors, run-time indices, match types
such as longest prefix or ternary matches, type-inference for
generic types in function bodies, annotations, and various cus-
tom table properties. Neither does our symbolic interpreter
provide semantics for these P416 language constructs. We
expect that adding most of these will be straightforward con-
ceptually, although adding each language construct is a fair
amount of additional engineering. One particular construct
that we anticipate being hard to support is externs because
extern behavior is very back-end-specific and it is hard to
develop accurate semantics for these externs without detailed
hardware knowledge of each target.
Unsupported bug types. We do not handle performance bugs,
e.g., a program that causes the compiler to run too long or a
program that causes the compiler to generate low performance
code. We anticipate that handling performance bugs would
require techniques that are conceptually very different from
our techniques, which deal with correctness.
Manual test case reduction. We have not developed an au-
tomatic test-case reduction suite (e.g., C-Reduce [38]) and
still reduce programs in a manual fashion, a laborious process.
After our testing pipeline has identified problematic programs
in a randomly generated batch, we inspect each P4 program
individually. We prune the random P4 program that caused
the bug until we get a sufficiently small program that can be
attached to a bug report. We hope to automate this process.
9 Related Work
P4K [24] was an early effort to formalize the P4 language
using the K-framework [39]. In the process of defining these
semantics, the authors found several issues in the P4 specifica-
tion. P4K supports the use of translation validation similar to
our tool. netdiff [17] uses symbolic execution to verify the
equivalence of data planes, such as those written in P4. They
do so by converting P4 and other data plane programs into the
SEFL language [45], which in turn can be converted to Z3.
The Z3 expressions corresponding to different data planes
can then be compared for equality. netdiff’s equivalence
checking technique is comparable to our translation validation
technique. However, neither P4K nor netdiff was explic-
itly designed for finding compiler bugs. To enable such bug
finding, we need both a source of random P4 programs and
a translation validation technique to compare intermediate
versions of these programs. Further, for some back ends such
as the Tofino compiler, translation validation is insufficient,
requiring us to use symbolic execution instead.
In concurrent work, Kodeswaran et al. [25] use the Ball-
Larus encoding [2] to track the execution path of packets
traversing the switch. By inspecting this path, a developer
can verify that packets have actually taken the expected path
through the P4 program. This technique is complementary to
our symbolic execution approach. We are considering using it
as a path coverage tool for metamorphic testing like EMI [26].
p4pktgen [34] is a P4 test-case generation tool, similar
to our symbolic execution technique. p4pktgen parses the
JSON file generated by the BMv2 back end and outputs a Z3
formula, which it uses to create test cases. Using p4pktgen
the authors were able to find several bugs in how BMv2
executes JSON files. However, because it operates on output
JSON instead of input P4, unlike Gauntlet, p4pktgen can not
test for bugs in intermediate compiler passes.
petr4 [3] aims to be an independent reference implementa-
tion of the P4 language. petr4 supports P416 and implements
an interpreter that potentially can be used to perform trans-
lation validation, fuzz testing, and differential testing on the
compiler. While we are explicitly targeting bug finding and
specialized our tools accordingly, petr4 aims to be fully in-
dependent reference implementation for P4. However, the
project is still in development and unreleased, preventing us
from using it for our purposes.
10 Conclusion
We presented 3 techniques for finding bugs in P4 compil-
ers. Gauntlet, our combination of random testing and formal
methods, is highly effective, uncovering 78 new, confirmed
P4 compiler bugs. Ultimately the restrictions in P4 allow
us to simplify traditional compiler bug finding considerably
when adapting it to packet processing. Going forward, we
plan to work on three areas. First, we plan on extending
our tool’s coverage of the P416 language. Second, we plan
to develop new bug-finding techniques to target classes of
bugs (e.g., performance bugs) that we currently do not cover.
Third, we plan to deploy our tool as part of P4C’s continuous
integration infrastructure. We have open sourced Gauntlet at
https://github.com/p4gauntlet.
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